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Comment on “Quantum Games and
Quantum Strategies”
In a recent Letter, Eisert et al. [1] presented
a quantum mechanical generalization of Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In the classical form of this game, ratio-
nal analysis leads the two players to ‘defect’ against
one-another in a mutually destructive fashion [2]. A
central result of Eisert et al.’s Letter is the observa-
tion that their quantum variant, illustrated in Figure
1, can avoid the ‘dilemma’: the mutually destructive
outcome is replaced with an effectively cooperative
one. Specifically, it is asserted that the maximally
entangled game’s unique Nash equilibrium [2] occurs
when both players apply the strategy Qˆ = iσz , yield-
ing a pay-off equivalent to cooperative behaviour in
the classical game.
In this Comment we show that their observation
is incorrect. The mistake follows from the following
erroneous assertion:
It proves to be sufficient to restrict the
strategic space to the 2-parameter set of uni-
tary 2 x 2 matrices,
Uˆ(θ, φ) =
(
eiφcosθ/2 sinθ/2
−sinθ/2 e−iφcosθ/2
)
,
(1)
with 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi and 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi/2.
Here we explicitly consider the complete set of all
local unitary operations (i.e. all of SU(2)), finding
that the properties of the game are wholly different:
the strategy Qˆ is not an equilibrium; indeed, there is
no equilibrium in the space of deterministic quantum
strategies. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the re-
striction to the set Uˆ(θ, φ) can reflect any reasonable
physical constraint (limited experimental resources,
say) because this set is not closed under composi-
tion. An ideal counter strategy to Qˆ, for example, is
iσx, which is equal to Uˆ(0, pi/2)Uˆ(pi, 0). The game of
[1] therefore does not constitute a reasonable variant
of the general case we consider here.
We will write the operations applied by the players
in the form Aˆ ⊗ Bˆ, where Aˆ is applied to the qubit
controlled by A and similarly for Bˆ. Suppose that
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Figure 1: a) The quantized Prisoner’s Dilemma, as
described in [1]. The pair of qubits are prepared in
the unentangled state |CC〉 and then sent through
the entangling gate Jˆ . Players A and B then ap-
ply their local unitary operations Aˆ ⊗ Iˆ and Iˆ ⊗ Bˆ,
respectively. A gate inverse to Jˆ is applied before
the final measurement. b) The Prisoner’s Dilemma
pay-off table chosen in [1].
player A applies transformation Xˆ to her qubit, pre-
pared as the first qubit in the maximally entangled
state
Jˆ |CC〉 = 1√
2
(|CC〉+ i |DD〉), (2)
where Jˆ = exp{ipiDˆ ⊗ Dˆ/4} and Dˆ = iσy is the ‘de-
fect’ matrix of [1]. The most general Xˆ ∈ SU(2) is of
the form Xˆ = (xij), where x11 = x
∗
22, x12 = −x∗21
and det Xˆ = 1. Therefore, A produces the state
(Xˆ ⊗ Iˆ)Jˆ |CC〉 = (I ⊗ Yˆ )J |CC〉 for Yˆ = (yij) ∈
SU(2), where y11 = x11 and y12 = ix12. In other
words, any unitary transformation which A applies
locally to her qubit is actually equivalent to a unitary
1
transformation applied locally by B. Consequently,
if B were to choose DˆYˆ †, we would have a final
state Jˆ†(Xˆ⊗DˆYˆ †)Jˆ |CC〉 = Jˆ†(Iˆ⊗DˆYˆ †Yˆ )Jˆ |CC〉 =
|CD〉, the optimal outcome for B. Thus, for any
given strategy of A, there is an ideal counter-strategy
for B, and vice-versa; there is no Nash equilibrium of
the kind suggested by Eisert et al. [3].
To obtain such equilibria we must extend the abil-
ities of the players: it suffices to allow them to make
probabilistic choices (rather than the full formalism
of completely positive maps considered in footnote 14
of [1]). Suppose that A adopts the following strategy:
she will choose a move Xˆ ∈ SU(2) at random with
respect to the Haar measure on SU(2). If B responds
with Yˆ0 ∈ SU(2) then the probability that outcome
i ∈ {CC,CD,DC,DD} will be measured is
Pi(Yˆ0) =
∫
SU(2)
∣∣∣〈i| Jˆ†(Xˆ ⊗ Yˆ0)Jˆ |CC〉
∣∣∣2 dXˆ
=
∫
SU(2)
∣∣∣〈i| Jˆ†(XˆXˆ†0Xˆ0 ⊗ I)Jˆ |CC〉
∣∣∣2 dXˆ
=
∫
SU(2)
∣∣∣〈i| Jˆ†(Xˆ ⊗ Iˆ)Jˆ |CC〉
∣∣∣2 dXˆ
= Pi(Iˆ), (3)
where Xˆ0 ∈ SU(2) is chosen such that (Xˆ0 ⊗
Iˆ)Jˆ |CC〉 = (Iˆ ⊗ Yˆ0)Jˆ |CC〉 and we have used the
right invariance of the Haar measure, assumed to be
normalized such that the volume of SU(2) is 1. Thus,
B’s choice of strategy does not matter; regardless of
his choice, his expected pay-off is simply an unbi-
ased average over the classical pay-offs. Therefore,
the situation where both players adopt this random
strategy is a Nash equilibrium: neither player can im-
prove his or her payoff by unilaterally altering choice
of strategy.
As a final point, we note that one can construct
Prisoner’s Dilemma-type pay-off tables for which the
quantum equilibrium pay-off we describe above is be-
low the classical equilibrium pay-off, or above it, or
even above the classical cooperative pay-off. In this
last case the ‘dilemma’ may be said to have been
removed [4]. To this extent the behavior of the quan-
tum generalization is qualitatively different from the
classical case, although in a way that is perhaps less
surprising than originally suggested by Eisert et al.
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